Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

State of Utah v. Roy Womack : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
C. Kay Bryson; Laura H. Cabanilla; Attorneys for Appellee.
Michael D. Esplin; Aldrich, Weight & Esplin; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Womack, No. 970539 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1063

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT O F /
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
n
9CKET '•"'»
urtiiimu i f

DP Till

PPEALS

"'

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

i IHT inrWriiitaffi % ilmiri

1

1 V I) b 3 M • L

Prior::y

N

ROY WOMACK,
Defendant/Appellant,
BRltlJ'

::)UNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, FROM THE JUDGMENT ENTERED
:KIS CASE oi THE HONORABLE
JOHN C. BACKLUND FROM CONVICTION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALCOHOL, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, AN" OPEN TONTAINER, A CLASS C
MISDEMEANOR
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JL". :'" LAI CC11BZ,

MICHAEL, L). ESPi^iv
Aldrich, Weight s Esoxxn
43 East 200 h:,:
P.O. Box "L"
Prnvn, TTT W,,", ,

Counsel for Appellant
C. KAY BRYSON J4 73;
Utah County Attorney
LAURA CABANILLA (684 5^
P-pputv Utah County Attorney
••'£•.?: Center, Suite 2100

Counsel ror Apx vllee u«»

FILED

MAY ? 9 19.98
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No.

vs.

Priority No. 2

970539-CA

ROY WOMACK,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, FROM THE JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THIS CASE BY THE HONORABLE
JOHN C. BACKLUND FROM CONVICTION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALCOHOL, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, AND OPEN CONTAINER, A CLASS C
MISDEMEANOR

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN
Aldrich, Weight & Esplin
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84603
Counsel for Appellant
C. KAY BRYSON (0473)
Utah County Attorney
LAURA CABANILLA (6845)
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, UT 84606
(801) 370-8026
Counsel for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

2

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT

5

POINT I

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT'S WAS CORRECT IN DENYING THE
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND IN UPHOLDING THE SEARCH
WARRANT

5

THE ISSUANCE OF AN ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANT WAS
PROPERLY MADE
9

POINT III THE OFFICERS RELIED IN "GOOD FAITH" ON THE SEARCH
WARRANT
15
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
ADDENDA - - none provided - - See Appellant's Addenda

i

16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Statutory Provisions
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-8(1) (a) (iii)

2

Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-8(4)(a)

2

Utah Code Annotated Section 77-23-202

2,9,10,11,14

Cases Cited
State

v. Horton,

U.S. v. Cardall,

848 P2d 708 (Ut. Ct. App 1993)

5,15

773 F2d 1128 (10th Cir 1985)

5,15

State

v Vigh,

State

v Thurman,

State

v Hansen,

732 P2d 127 (Utah 1987)

State

v Brooks,

849 P2d 640 (Utah App), cert

871 P2d 1030

7

846 P2d 1256 (Utah 1993)

7
7
denied,

860 P2d 943

(Utah 1993)
State
Illinois

7

v Purser,

828 P2d 515 (Utah App 1992)

v Gates,

8

462 US 213, 103 SCt 2317, 76 LEd 2d 527

(1983)
McNeill
United

8
v Commonwealth,
States

v Goodwin,

395 SE2d 460, (Va App 1990)
854 F2d 33 (4th Cir 1988)

ii

....

11

. . . .11,13

United States

v Washington,

852 F2d 803 (4th Cir), cert

denied, 488

US 974, 109 SCt 512. 102 LEd 2d 547 (1988)
United

States

v Hale,

784 F2d 1465 (9th Cir 1986)

United

States

v Lowe,

575 F2d 1193 (6th Cir), cert

11
. . . .11,13
denied,

869. 99 SCt 198, 58 LEd 2d 180 (1978)
United

States

ex rel Beal

v Skaff,

11,13

418 F2d 430 (7th Cir

1969)

11,13

State

v Gutman,

State

v Wine,

State

v Coker,

United

v Outland,

12
12

476 F2d 581 (6th Cir 1973)

. . . . 12

465 NW2d 787, (SD 1991)
v Garcia,

882 F2d 699 (2nd Cir) , cert

Grant v United States,

US

12
denied

sub nom

, 110 SCt 348, 107 Led 2d 336

(1989)
United

. 11,13

746 SW 2d 167 (Tenn 1987)

States

States

670 P2d 1166, 1172 (Alaska Ct App 1983)

787 SW2d 31, (Tenn Crim App 1989)

State v Engel,
United

439 US

13,14
States

v Dorhofer,

859 F2d 1195 (4th Cir), cert

denied,

490

US 1005, 109 SCt 1639, 104 LEd 2d 155 (1989)

13

Johnson

13

People
denied,

v State,
v Glen,

617 P2d 1117 (Alaska 1980)
30 NY 2d 252, 331 NY 2d 656, 282 NE 2d 614,

sub nom Baker

v New York,

cert

409 US 849, 93 SCt 58, 34 LEd 2d

91 (1972)

13

iii

Alvidres

v Superior

Court,

12 Cal App 3d 575, 90 Cal Rptr 682

(1970)
Illinois

13
v Andreas,

463 US 765, 1034 SCt 3319, 77 LEd 2d 1003

(1983)
U.S.

v. Leon,

15
468 US 897 (1984)

15

iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No.

vs.

Priority No. 2

970539-CA

ROY WOMACK,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF PLAINT IFF/APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ENTERED
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE JOHN L. BACKLUND, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This appeal is from the decision of the Fourth Judicial
District court, Judge John C. Backlund, denying appellant's Motion
to Suppress Evidence following a hearing and from final judgment of
conviction of Possession of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free
zone, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§5837-8(1)(a)(iii) & 58-37-8(4)(a), following a conditional plea, on
April 23, 1997 at which date Defendant/Appellant withdrew his prior
not guilty pleas to both counts and entered No Contest Pleas.
Statutory maximums were imposed and stayed pending the appeal
Defendant/Appellant

indicated
1

he

would

be

making.

Defendant/Appellant was instructed to file the appeal within 30
days.

Minute entry was made recording these events, however,

judgment was not signed on that date.

Findings and Judgment were

later prepared by Appellant's counsel, submitted to the court and
signed June 23, 1997. Notice of Appeal was made within 30 days of
that date, August 20, 1997.

The matter appears to be properly

before the Court as Notice of Appeal was filed within thirty days
of the date judgment was signed.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was there sufficient probable cause set forth in the affidavit
in the support of the search warrant to provide the necessary
probable cause for issuance of the search warrant?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah, Utah Code Annotated, §77-23-202.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from the decision of the Fourth Judicial
District court, Judge John C. Backlund, denying appellant's
Motion to Suppress Evidence following a hearing and from final
judgment of conviction of Possession of a Controlled Substance in
2

a Drug Free zone, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§58-37-8(1) (a) (iii) & 58-37-8(4) (a), following a
conditional plea, on April 23, 1997 at which date
Defendant/Appellant withdrew his prior not guilty pleas to both
counts and entered No Contest Pleas, indicating an intention to
appeal the court's denial of the motion to suppress.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff/Appellee stipulates to the facts as presented by
the Defendant/Appellant in his Memorandum In Support of Motion to
Suppress, with the following clarification, or additions:
1.

The package was addressed personally to the defendant,

Roy Womack, but had the wrong address.
2.

That the sender, Eileen OfHara ("O'Hara"), contacted

UPS about the wrong address, and gave to UPS personnel the
correct address; however, did not change the addressee
information.

The package was to be delivered to the Defendant,

at the corrected address.
3.

O'Hara contacted the Womacks by telephone at the

original address to find out where the package was.
4.

Defendant went to the Womacks at the original address

to find out where the package was.

3

5.

Prior to the officers going with the UPS employee to

the address with the package, the UPS employee contacted O'Hara,
and advised her that the package would be delivered to the
corrected address between the hours of 12:00pm and 3:00pm, and
that the addressee, the Defendant, had to be personally present,
with appropriate ID to receive the delivery.

O'Hara told the UPS

employee that she would "page" the defendant and make sure he was
at the corrected address during those hours to receive the
package between.
6.

Officers went with the UPS employee to the address in

the delivery truck with the UPS employee. After arriving there,
the officer gave the UPS employee the package, while they were in
the cargo/package area of the UPS delivery truck.
7.

After the delivery was made, officer verified by

description, and signature for the package, that the package's
recipient was in fact the Defendant.
8.

Officers then waited 10 minutes before executing the

search warrant.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Defendant/Appellant moves to suppress the evidence located
during the execution of the search warrant based upon two general
arguments:

(1) that the affidavit was not sufficient to probable

4

cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and (2) that the
search warrant itself is defective, in that it is an
"anticipatory" search warrant.

Plaintiff/Appellee maintains that

the affidavit provided probable cause, and the search warrant was
properly issued, despite the fact it was "anticipatory" in
nature.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY UPHELD THE SEARCH WARRANT WHICH WAS
BASED UPON PROBABLE CAUSE
Defendant/Appellant attacks the affidavit in that it does
not contain probable cause to believe that the Defendant lived at
the location, and that there was no information stating that
drugs would be located on the premises prior to the UPS
delivering the package.
In State

v. Horton,

848 P2d 708, 711, the Utah Court of

Appeals stated:
[W]hen a warrant has been issued, the legal sufficiency of
the underlying affidavit has already been determined by a
magistrate, and the magistrate's determination is entitled
to credence. [Quoting U.S.

v. Cardall,

(10th Cir 1985).
5

773 F2d 1128, 1133

In this case, a neutral judge reviewed the affidavit and
found it sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant.
In reviewing the affidavit in support of the warrant,
Plaintiff/Appellee points out the following:
In Paragraph 2, the officer reported that the package was
addressed to the Defendant, a Roy Womack, living at 120 West 1200
North, in Orem, Ut. That address did not exist, and so the
package was mistakenly delivered to 233 East 100 South, Orem,
Utah, the address for the only Womack family in Orem which was
listed in the phone book.
In Paragraph 3, the officer stated:
Eileen O'Hara was very irate concerning the delivery of her
package and was told where the package was delivered and
that the package would be recovered and delivered to the new
address given to UPS by Eileen O'Hara. The new address of
delivery given was 127 West 1200 North, Orem, Utah.
Interestingly enough, though O'Hara was "irate" about where
the package was delivered, and changed the location to where it
was to be delivered, she did not change the name of the
addressee—it remained the Defendant.

Therefore, the package,

which was known to contain a controlled substance, was to be
delivered personally to the Defendant, but at the corrected
address.

This confirms that Defendant was a resident, or at

least was able to personally and physically receive deliveries at
6

the corrected address.

Just because an individual's name is not

on the utilities bills, does not presumptively show that an
individual does not live there.

The officers confirmed that the

Defendant lived at the residence, or at least physically received
personal deliveries at the residence, by statements made by
O'Hara, in requesting the package be sent to the Defendant at the
corrected address.

This information was sufficiently set forth

in the affidavit for the magistrate to view and upon which to
determine probable cause.
State stipulates that the affidavit does not reference any
possession of drugs, etc., on the premises at the time the
affidavit was presented to the magistrate; however, that does not
necessarily sound the affidavit's demise.

Generally, Utah's

appellate courts have held that the finding of probable cause in
an affidavit is a "practical common sense" determination, based
upon the "totality of the circumstances" as presented in the
affidavit.
Thurman,

See, State v Vigh,

871 P2d 1030 (???); State

846 P2d 1256 (Utah 1993); State

(Utah 1987); State

v Brooks,

v Hansen,

732 P2d 127

849 P2d 640 (Utah App), cert

860 P2d 943 (Utah 1993; State v Purser,

7

v

denied,

828 P2d 515 (Utah App

1992); accord, Illinois

v Gates,

462 US 213, 103 SCt 2317, 76 LEd

2d 527 (1983).
In the affidavit, the officer detailed: (1) the course in
which the package had travelled prior to arriving in police
custody [paragraphs 2-3], (2) the actions of the defendant and
co-conspirator in the matter [paragraph 4], (3) the officers
training and experience in cases where controlled substances are
shipped through the mail and/or sold from a residence, and,
though the exact quantity of controlled substance in the package
is not specified, that the amount in the package exceeded the
general personal use amount, and would yield a profit if sold on
the street, and also that in residences from which drugs are sold
that other controlled substances and paraphernalia are located
[paragraphs 6-7], (4) what actions would be taken with the
package in the immediate future [paragraph 8], and (5) what
evidence the officer expected to locate as a result of the
search, which included the package material, plus other
controlled substances and paraphernalia [paragraphs 9-10, & 13].
It should be noted that the affiant was very specific in
detailing that he desired to make a controlled delivery of the
package, and then execute the warrant [see paragraphs 8 and 13].
The magistrate was not deceived in this fact, and based upon the
8

information presented in the affidavit, determined that probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant existed.
The state maintains that the affidavit presented to the
magistrate was sufficient to establish the requisite probable
cause

standard of the Utah and federal constitutions.

POINT II
THE ISSUANCE OF AN ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANT
WAS PROPERLY MADE
The issue of an "anticipatory" search warrant seems to be a
question of first impression in Utah.

Defendant/Appellant

propounds that persuasive case law exists from other
jurisdictions that invalidate such warrants, and urges the Court
to accept that position. He also suggests to the Court that
Section 77-23-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, ("UCA")
holds against such warrants.

Plaintiff/Appellee argues that

section 77-23-202, UCA, does not hold such limiting language, and
proffers to the Court case law of jurisdictions that uphold the
validity of such warrants.
Section 77-23-202, UCA, states:
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search
warrant if there is probable cause to believe it: (1)
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, (2)
9

has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being
used to commit or conceal the commission of an offense;
or (3) is evidence
of illegal
conduct.
[Italics added.]
Clearly, under section 77-23-202(1) and (2), it would appear
that the language is in the past or present tense; however, 7723-202(3) does not contain such limiting language.

It simply

refers to the property or evidence being identified as evidence
of illegal conduct.

It does it specify when or where the

evidence of illegal conduct must be seized, only how—as directed
by the warrant.

Therefore, under section 77-23-202(3), UCA,

evidence of illegal conduct does not have to be in possession of
a particular person, a suspect, and in fact can be in custody of
the police, at the time the affidavit is presented to the
magistrate. As long as the magistrate knows this, and that the
evidence will be at a particular location, at some certain time,
77-23-202, UCA, does not preclude the issuance of a warrant for
the seizure.
In this matter, it was judicially expedient to allow the
delivery of the package before it was officially seized under
authority of the warrant.

The people of the State of Utah have a

direct public interest in determining who is importing controlled
substances into the state through the mail and package delivery
businesses.

They have a public interest in stopping the
10

importation, and prosecuting those who flood this state with
illegal drugs-

In this matter, the only way for the state to

determine exactly who was receiving the illegal drugs was to
perform a controlled delivery.

Without the execution of a search

warrant after the delivery, the state would not have been able to
retrieve the evidence, arrest, nor prosecute the importer.
In the case before the bar, the officers did exactly what is
required of them to protect the constitutional rights of the
Defendant/Appellant, while at the same time, seeking to enforce
the drug laws of this state through aggressive efforts.

The

state maintains that section 77-23-202, UCA, does not limit a
court's discretion of finding probable cause, and issuing a
warrant, of anticipatory nature.
State proffers for the court that many other jurisdictions
have held that anticipatory search warrants do not violate
provisions of their state and federal constitutions.
v Commonwealth,

In

McNeill

395 SE2d 460, (Va App 1990), the Virginia court

stated:
Warrants, issued when the contraband which gives rise
to the search is not yet at the premise to be searched
have been designated "anticipatory search warrants,"
[footnote omitted] and have been declared to be lawful
when the contraband to be seized is on a sure course to
its destination. United States
v Goodwin, 854 F2d 33
11

(4th Cir 1988);

United

States

v Washington,

852 F2d

803 (4th Cir), cert denied, 488 US 974, 109 SCt 512.
102 LEd 2d 547 (1988); United States
v Hale, 784 F2d
1465 (9th Cir 1986); United States
v Lowe, 575 F2d
1193 (6th Cir), cert denied, 439 US 869. 99 SCt 198, 58
LEd 2d 180 (1978); United States
ex rel Beal v Skaff,
418 F2d 430 (7th Cir 1969). To be valid, however,
"there must be probable cause to believe that the items
to be seized will be at the place to be searched at the
time the warrant is executed. State v Gutman, 670 P2d
1166, 1172 (Alaska Ct App 1983). The probable cause
requirement is met when "the evidence creates
substantial probability that the seizable property will
be on the premises when searched." Id. [Other citation
omitted.] McNeill,
395 SE2d at 462.
In this matter, the package was on a sure
destination.

course

to its

The Defendant/Appellant, personally, and his co-

conspirator, made sure that the package was to be delivered to
the Defendant personally at the location to be searched.

The

magistrate was made aware of this fact through the affidavit's
information.
In State v Wine,

787 SW2d 31, (Tenn Crim App 1989), the

court upheld the anticipatory warrant, and stated:
Our Supreme Court has embraced the use of "anticipatory
search warrants." State v Coker, 746 SW 2d 167 (Tenn
1987). Such warrants do not violate the fourth
amendment if they are executed following the delivery
of the contraband. [Secular citation omitted.] The
affidavit should inform the magistrate that the known
or suspected contraband will be delivered in the
immediate future and the basis of the affiant's
knowledge that the item will be delivered. See,
United
States
v Outland,
476 F2d 581 (6th Cir 1973). Following
12

the delivery of the illegal substance , the warrant
ripens and the search may proceed. While it is not
crucial to the validity of this search, it is
preferable that the warrant explicitly condition the
execution upon the occurrence of a specified event.
State v Wine, 787 SW2d at 33.
In this matter, the affidavit set forth that the package was
to be delivered in the immediate future, and the affiant's
knowledge that the package would be delivered.

The officer was

in possession of the package, and would be directly involved in
the delivery with UPS employees. Additionally, the warrant
clearly expressed that the warrant could not be executed until
after the package's delivery.
In State

v Engel,

465 NW2d 787, (SD 1991), the court found:

According to the clear weight of authority, an
anticipatory search warrant based on a controlled
delivery of contraband to occur in the near future is
not unconstitutional per se. United States
v Garcia,
882 F2d 699 (2nd Cir), cert denied sub nom Grant v
United States,
US
, 110 SCt 348, 107 Led 2d 336
(1989); United States
v Dorhofer,
859 F2d 1195 (4th
Cir), cert denied, 490 US 1005, 109 SCt 1639, 104 LEd
2d 155 (1989); United States
v Goodwin, 854 F2d 33 (4th
Cir 1988); United States
v Hale, 784 F2d 1465 (9th
Cir), cert denied, 479 US 829, 107 SCt 110, 93 LEd 2d
59 (1986); United States
v Lowe, 575 F2d 1193 (6th
Cir), cert denied, 439 US 869. 99 SCt 198, 58 LEd 2d
180 (1978); United States
ex rel Beal v Skaff, 418 F2d
430 (7th Cir 1969); Johnson v State,
617 P2d 1117
(Alaska 1980); People v Glen, 30 NY 2d 252, 331 NY 2d
656, 282 NE 2d 614, cert denied,
sub nom Baker v New
York, 409 US 849, 93 SCt 58, 34 LEd 2d 91 (1972); State
13

v Gutman, 670 P2d 1166, (Alaska Ct App 1983);
Alvidres
v Superior
Court, 12 Cal App 3d 575, 90 Cal Rptr 682
(1970). See also,
[Secular citation omitted.],
Illinois
v Andreas,
463 US 765, 1034 SCt 3319, 77 LEd 2d 1003
(1983). Engel, 465 NW2d at 789.
The court also reiterated that the warrant should be
specific in limiting the conditions that govern the warrant's
execution.
Cir) , cert

Quoting,

United

States

v Garcia,

882 F2d 699 (2nd

denied sub nom Grant v United States,

US

, 110

SCt 348, 107 Led 2d 336 (1989), the court directed:
When an anticipatory warrant is used, the magistrate
should protect against premature execution by listing
in the warrant conditions governing the execution which
are explicit, clear and narrowly drawn so as to avoid
misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents.
[Italics added by Engel court] Garcia, 882 F2d at 703704.
Again, in this case, the magistrate was aware that the
package was to be delivered, and that the warrant would be
anticipatory in nature. Additionally, the magistrate explicitly
limited the discretion of the officers in when to execute the
warrant, by including in it the command that the search occur
following the package's delivery.
The Plaintiff/Appellee maintains that the search warrant was
validly issued, based upon probable cause, and even though it was

14

"anticipatory" in nature, complied fully with the requirements of
Section 77-23-202, UCA, and the Utah, and Federal, constitutions.

POINT III
OFFICERS RELIED IN "GOOD FAITH" ON SEARCH WARRANT
Of additional argument, Plaintiff/Appellee proffers to the
court that the evidence should not be suppressed, as the officers
acted in good-faith on a judicially issued search warrant.

In

the matter at bar, the officer submitted the affidavit to a
neutral judge for his review, and determination of probable
cause.

Upon reviewing the affidavit, Judge Burningham found that

the affidavit fulfill the probable cause requirement.

Finding

such, Judge Burningham issued the search warrant authorizing the
search of Defendant's place of residence or, location for
personally receipt of UPS deliveries.
The United States Supreme Court's decision of U.S.

v.

Leon,

468 US 897 (1984), established a "good faith" rule which
precludes the exclusion of evidence seized by an officer when
acting in good faith upon a warrant.
In State

v. Horton,

supra,

the Utah Court of Appeals stated:

Evidence obtained by officers acting in good faith
objectively and reasonably relying on a search warrant
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, need not be
excluded even if the warrant is subsequently invalidated by
15

a lack of probable cause. [Citing Leon, supra at 922.]
There is a presumption that when an officer relies upon a
warrant, the officer is acting in good faith. [Citing
Cardall,
supra at 1133] It is only when the officer's
reliance is "wholly unwarranted" that good faith is absent.
[Citation list omitted.] . . . .
Leon describes four scenarios in which the exclusionary rule
applies and good faith cannot be found: (1) the issuing
magistrate is misled by the information in the affidavit
that affiant knew was false or would have known was false
except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) the
issuing magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role and
fails to perform his neutral and detached function; (3) the
warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable; (4) the warrant is so facially
deficient that it failed to particularize the place to be
search or the things to be seized, the executing officer
cannot presume it to be valid. Leon, 4 68 US at 923.
Defendant/Appellant has failed to show that any one of the
four criterion for rejection of the good-faith execution of the
warrant are present.

In this matter, the officers who executed

the search were acting in good faith upon the issued search
warrant of a neutral magistrate, which granted them authority to,
make the delivery, and then execute the warrant.

The evidence

obtained as a result of the search is admissible, and not subject
to suppression.
CONCLUSION
Appellee submits that the search warrant was properly upheld
by the trial court because it was supported by probable cause and

16

because an "anticipatory search warrant" can be a valid warrant
if certain conditions are met, which were met here.
Appellee submits that Appellant's conviction should be
affirmed.
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Respectfully submitted this

"JMJA-
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1998.

4j

Laura' H. Cabanilla
Deputy Utah County Attorney
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